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Introduction
New independent Ukraine is going through a
difficult time in its transition from a central planned
to a market economy. This process revealed a
number of unpleasant features of Ukraine’s national
economy. Among them are pervasive tax evasion, a
falling down of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
a rapid increase of national debt, widespread
corruption, crisis of system of education, etc.
Macroeconomic policy of Ukrainian government
has not been very successful. One of the reasons is
that Ukrainian economists and decision makers have
not paid enough attention to microeconomic
consequences of macro decisions. Ukraine’s future
depends basically on whether the bulk of the
workforce will have incentive to work. This is a part
of a more general problem: that of relationships
between motives, incentives, and behavior.
Since 1988 1 I have studied the reaction of
individuals to different incentives. This gives the
basis to explain a lot of economic effects under
transition, especially a phenomenon of low labor
productivity in the former Soviet Union com-
paratively with USA, Japan and other countries with
developed market economy. I approached this
problem by using a standard model of labor supply
(see, for example, its description and analysis in
H. Varian 2) and expanded upon it by incorporating
features that reflect some peculiarities arising from
social-economic environments of centrally planned
economy.
My nearest task is to study some microeconomic
effects and peculiarities of individual behavior in the
different stages of transitional economy, beginning
from an economy, which is undergoing transition
up to developed market economy. I would like to
understand why in contemporary Ukraine the
majority of businesspersons do not have encou-
ragement to pay taxes, to organize legal profitable
production, why employees do not have incentives
to productive work.
One of the main idea of my research is that it is
impossible to understand the nature and peculiarities
of the Transition without careful studying it’s initial
point — Centrally Planned Economy and it’s
collapse.
The Transition from the Centrally planned to
Market economy is mainstream of contemporary
economic thought. According to historical point of
view the Transition is one of the links in the chain:
Centrally Planned Economy — Collapse of the
Centrally Planned Economy — Transition — Market
Economy.
In my research I have tried to describe the vision
of some of links, in particular, the Centrally Planned
Economy, the Collapse of the Centrally Planned
Economy, and the Transition from point of view of
individual workers.
1 See ßñòðåìñüêèé À. È. Ìîäåëü îïòèìèçàöèè íîðìû
îò÷èñëåíèé è åå àíàëèç// Òåçèñû äîêëàäîâ íàó÷íîé êîíôå-
ðåíöèè “Òåîðèÿ è ïðàêòèêà ïåðåñòðîéêè õîçÿéñòâåííîãî
ìåõàíèçìà”, Ìîñêâà, Ìîñêîâñêèé óíèâåðñèòåò, 1990.
2 Varian, H. R. Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern
Approach, 3rd Edition, New York: W. W. Norton & Company:
1993, p. 623.
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Current economic and political situation in Ukraine
Economic problems
Half of Ukraine’s economy is in the 21st century,
half remains in the middle ages.
Charles Clover, Financial Times observer
It is impossible not to continue so picturesque
simile. “…while the country (Ukraine 3) remains
capable of building some of the most advanced
technology in the world, from lasers to nuclear
turbines to rockets boosters, its GDP has fallen by
one half since 1991 and farmers have gone back to
using horses because they cannot afford gasoline for
their tractors.” 4
Really, since 1991, the first year of new
independent Ukraine, the levels of production and
welfare have been decreasing.
The production fall down is one of character
features of the first step of Transition. Then the level
of production begins to rise. The majority of
transition countries, including the countries, which
were the parts of the former Soviet Union, have
passed through painful beginning of the Transition
and started to increase the level of GDP. At the same
time, Ukraine is continuing to suffer from the start
of Transition. What is the reason for? Who is guilty?
The majority of experts and economists on
transition economics consider the main reason of
the failures of Ukrainian transition in delay of it
transition reform performance.
For evaluating of the level of the Transition
reforms the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) uses the Indexes of Reform
Progress (IRP). IRP is a sum of subindexes of
institutional changes in nine dimensions: large-scale
privatization, small-scale privatization, enterprise
restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign-
exchange system, competition policy, banking
reform, securities markets, and legal rules on
investment. Each dimension is scored on a scale from
1 to 4, where 4 means institutional conditions
comparable to those of advanced market economies.
According to the 1995 and 1997 EBRD reports IRPs
for some country are follows (see the Table 1).
J. D. Sachs 5 has proved statistical relation
between economic growth and IRP. He performed
a series of econometric estimations, one of which is
given below:
Growth (1989—95) = -23.15 + 0.62 ×IRP.
(1)
According to the last formula each unit of IRP
boosts GDP growth by 0.62 % on average.
Analogous estimations were made by M. Se-
lowsky and M. Ricardo 6 using the following
equation and combined data for 25 transition
economies during the 1990—95 period:
GROWTH t = — 10.65 + 11.42 LIBt — 15.70 WAR t,
(2)
where WAR = 1 for countries in conflict in
period t, 0 — otherwise, and where LIB
t
 = is
aggregate liberalization index.
The aggregate liberalization index is a weighted
average of indexes of reforms in three areas: internal
reforms (price liberalization, elimination of state
orders); external reforms (foreign trade, exchange-rate
regime); and private-sector reforms (privatization,
banking reform).
These results also highlight the crucial role of
reforms in economic growth of transition countries.
The Table 2 contains more recent estimations
of IRP:
Table 2. Progress in transition in eastern Europe,
the Baltics and the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) 7, 8
Country Index of Reform Progress (1997)
Albania 21
Armenia 20
Azerbaijan 16
Belarus 13
Bulgaria 22
Croatia 24
Czech Republic 27
Estonia 27
FYR Macedonia 21
Georgia 21
Hungary 28
Kazakhstan 21
Latvia 29
Table 1. Index of Reform Progress for some
transition countries
Country Index of Reform Progress
Bulgaria 23
Czech Republic 33
Hungary 33
Poland 33
Romania 23
Russia 23
Slovakia 31
Ukraine 20
3 Author insertion.
4 Clover, Ch. Dissent means descent. Financial Times, May
5, 1988.
5 Sachs, J. D. The Transition at Mid Decade, American
Economic Review, May 1996, 86 (2), pp. 128—133.
6 Selowsky, Marcelo and Ricardo, Martin. Policy
Performance and Output Growth in the Transition Economies,
American Economic Review, May 1997, 87 (2), pp. 349—353.
7 CIS includes as full or associated members all countries
of the former Soviet Union, except the Baltic states
8 Transition Report 1997, European Bank for Re-
construction and Development, 1997.
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Country Index of Reform Progress (1997)
Lithuania 24
Moldova 21
Poland 26
Romania 22
Russian Federation 23
Slovak Republic 27
Slovenia 25
Tajikistan 13
Ukraine 19
Uzbekistan 19
In 1995 Ukraine had one of the lowest IRP. In
1997 the situation in Ukraine was not improved.
Slow steps on economic reforms way in Ukraine
does not mean the policy of drift from the state side.
Moreover, by force of soviet habit Ukrainian state
tries to control everything. For example, the certain
increasing of private sector, which had occurred
those years, was not due, but in spite of state
regulations. This increasing could be much more if
the state did not introduce too high tax rates.
Producer attempts to avoid tax press results in the
growth of large informal activity both in private and
state sector as well.
Data, such as those in Table 3, are consistent
with this claim.
Table 3. Share of the unofficial economy
in GDP, 1995 9
Country Share of the unofficial
 economy in GDP (%)
Azerbaijan 60.6
Belarus 19.3
Bulgaria 36.2
Czech Republic 11.3
Estonia 11.8
Georgia 62.6
Hungary 29.0
Kazakhstan 34.3
Latvia 35.3
Lithuania 21.6
Moldova 35.7
Poland 12.6
Romania 19.1
Russian Federation 41.6
Slovak Republic   5.8
Ukraine 48.9
Uzbekistan   6.5
It is need to say that state economic policy in
Ukraine is determinated by two forces: government
and Parliament, which were acting in different
manner. For example, the only exit of the described
situation was to lower tax rates, what has been
reflected in the proposals presented by the govern-
ment to parliament at the end of 1996. The adoption
of tax reform package should make the basis for
formation of “Budget 1997”. Parliament debates
had taken quite long time, what results in the delay
of budget approval. By the middle of summer only
two solutions on tax problem had been passed
(about VAT and corporate tax). Even here, it was
adopted by Parliament, that the law on VAT will
be implement only in October. As concerns the law
on personal income tax, it had passed the final
reading, but had not passed finally. But at least
important steps in reforming of tax system had been
done, scilicet: VAT was changed on 20 % in base
rate and all exemptions were eliminated; the
corporate profit tax was switched from revenue to
profit taxation and changed on 30 % in base rate;
the individual income tax decreased from 40 % to
30 % in the rate, the payroll tax reduces a little
too. From 51 % it becomes 49 %, instead of 34 %,
which was proposed by government. The last one,
however, did not stop its attempts to promote tax
reforms.
One of the achievements of independent Ukraine
on the way of reforms is the setting its national
currency “hryvnia” (ãðèâíÿ). The hryvnia was fixed
in September of 1996. “After a painful bout of hyper-
inflation, Kiev (Kyiv) 10 has brought inflation down
to an annual 10 per cent and launched a relatively
stable national currency, the hryvna (hryvnia)” 11.
However, the victory over inflation was won in
a very specific way. Instead of expand money supply
Table 2
10 “Kiev” is English spelling from Russian. Now the English
spelling from Ukrainian “Kyiv” is more appropriate.
11 Freeland, Ch. and Clover, Ch. Captive economy
threatens freedom. Financial Times, May 5, 1988.
9 Kaufmann, D. and Kaliberda, A. Integrating the
unofficial economy into the dynamics of post—socialist
economies: A framework for analysis and evidence,
Development Discussion Paper No. 558, Harvard Institute for
International Development, pp. 81—120.
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Figure 1. Growth of unofficial economy in Ukraine
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by printing machine, government has invented a very
simple way: not to pay some internal liabilities.
Namely, salary to employers on state enterprises and
organizations in different branches of economy (first
of all in education, culture, health), some others. This
idea was caught promptly by managers of state and
commercial enterprises and had generated the crisis
of mutual default.
In 1998 the overdue debts of the Ukrainian
economy stand an a staggering $60bn, according to
studies by the European Union’s Tacis program and
HIID. Most of these debts are owed between
enterprises, but workers and pensioners are owed
about $3—4bn by public and private entities.
Meanwhile, the amount of barter in the
Ukrainian economy grew to 66bn hryvnia ($34bn)
worth of transactions last year, according to the state
statistics committee. 12
It is well known that the transition process is
not set with roses in each transition country. Each
transition is a road filled with tactic losses and
strategic gains. In some cases, the short—run (tactic)
losses can be very painful and, as such, be very
dangerous, as people find it difficult to relate present
events with long—run equilibrium. As a result,
public support for the continued undertaking of
reform weakens and the process faces the danger of
being stalled or reversed. My point of view is that
Ukraine’s suffering from the transition process is
most painful, so that, short—run losses by the
Ukrainian people can eclipse the perspective of a
normal society construction.
As A. Aslund notes ”...in Ukraine we see how
dangerous it is not to act vigorously for a
fundamental economic and political trans-
formation” 13.
The question of why the reforms are delayed in
Ukraine logically arises.
Political  situation
The most important achievement of Ukrainian
society since 1991 is that Ukraine has not been roped
in any military conflicts. Remembering the history
of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire, of which
Ukraine was a part for over 300 years, we can
conclude that the period 1991—98 has been the most
peaceful period in Ukraine’s history. This
achievement becomes even more noteworthy, when
account is taken of the fact that the 20th century saw
most sanguinary events such as the Russian—
Japanese War, First World War, the Russian Civil
War, Stalin’s collectivization, artificial famine in
Ukraine and extermination of Ukrainian intellectual
elite, Soviet—Finland War, World War II, Soviet—
Japanese War, Soviet interventions in Hungary
(1954), Czechoslovakia (1968), Afghanistan (1979),
Caribbean crisis, Soviet support of some non-
democratic regimes. The last crime of Soviet regime
in Ukraine has been the Chornobyl catastrophe
in 1986.
In 1996 a progressive constitution was adopted
by Ukrainian Parliament. All changes while have
taken place in the state administration, inclusive of
elections of Parliament and President of Ukraine
were legitimized.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union Ukraine
had the third largest arsenal of nuclear weapon in
the world. In particular, 176 intercontinental missiles
were stationed on its soil.14 The Ukrainian
Parliament made historical decision to make of
Ukraine a non nuclear country.
The last election (i.e., March 29, 1998) to the
Ukrainian Parliament (Verhovna Rada) was very
successful for the left—oriented parties (see
Table 4, p. 8).
The previous Ukrainian Parliament was also
very leftward oriented. As such, it created serious
obstacle for some progressive decisions and
initiatives of the President, government and the
Central Bank. We have already spoken about the
tax reforms campaign. The Parliament has not
created a friendly climate for foreign investment, and
a reasonable tax system.
Examples could be added. The Parliament
leftists had formed a strong lobby for non profitable
state enterprises and archaic collective farm system
in agriculture.
At the latter, needed privatization reforms in
agriculture has been retarded by the parliament’s
hesitation. This was in contradiction to the
constitution of Ukraine, which declared private
property rights including land ownership.
Another example is born by the opposition from
parliament to a more rapid pace of privatization.
A case in point was the struggle between the
Parliament and the government in 1997 over the list
of enterprises which would be privatized. Due to the
Parliament resistance against privatization, the
government was able to list only 5,155 enterprises
among those to be privatized instead its original list
of nearly six thousand enterprises.
The paradox is that the left Parliament has
been legislatively and democratically elected by
the people.
Paradoxical behavior of Ukrainian voters once
more corroborates the necessity of studying the
12 Clover, Ch. Ukraine pays for hollow victory, Financial
Times, January 21, 1998, p. 17.
13 Aslund, A. Ed. Economic Transformation in Russia.
New York, St. Martins Press, 1994. viii + 190 pp.
14 Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B, and Stacchetti, E. How (Not)
to Sell Nuclear Weapons, American Economic Review,
September 1996, 86 (4), pp. 814—829.
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transition process on micro-level, in particular, by
analyzing and understanding the behavior of
employees.
Ukraine way: what to choose?
We have said that the nation—state
is the only effective implementing unit
for economic development of latecomers.
Benidict Anderson
Japan in 1946 and Ukraine now
Our century was not only very bloody, it has
also demonstrated good examples of nations and
states revivals, and economic miracles. Most notable
examples of these are Germany and Japan. In
addition, since 1989, Japan has been the largest
provider of bilateral Official Development
Assistance (ODA). This is why the Japanese
economists’ and policy makers’ vision of trans-
formation problems and Japanese economic
experience are of big interest for Ukrainians.
For scholars of post — soviet and Ukraine
economies, Japan’s transition from a wartime
controlled economy to a market economy is
important especially as such study offers suggestions
and lessons which are relevant to the transition of East
European and the Former Soviet Union (EEFSU)
countries from a socialist economic system.
A lot of economists have studied the phenomena
of Japanese economic miracle, some of them have
fulfilled a comparative analysis between initial
points of Japan recovery and Ukraine transition
(see, for example, J. Sachs20). In Table 5 I had tried
to generalize their results 21, 22 to show briefly the
common features and the differences between the
economic situation in modern Ukraine and post-war
Japan.
As table shows, it appears that there are a lot of
common. So Japanese experience could be of big use
for Ukrainian economists.
What ways Japan had chosen to overcome the
post-war crisis? What steps were more or less
effective on this way?
IMF — World Bank and Japanese approaches to transition
and developing economies
Apparently, in postwar Japan there were a lot
of discussions 23 about the ways out of economic
crisis, especially the ways out of inflation. The main
of them could be found in the report “Basic Issues
of Japanese Economic Reconstruction”24 by Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (1946) and colligated as follows:
a) “Quick Stabilization” due to shock therapy
by radical monetary policy (the main ideologist
Kihachiro Kimura, Member of Parliament);
b) “Conditional Quick Stabilization” due to shock
therapy, which schould be implemented after break-
through the certain level of national output (the main
ideologist Prof. Hiromi Arisawa, Tokyo University);
Table 4. Results of election to the Ukrainian parliament in March of 1998 15
Party  Number of voters,
    who  support this party
Percentages Number of deputies
mandates
Political
    orientation 16
 Communist party of Ukraine
Narodnii Ruh (People Movement 17)
of Ukraine
 Block of Socialist and
Agrarian Parties
 Greenpeace of Ukraine
 People-democratic party 18
 Ukrainian association “Gromada
(Sodality) 19”
 Progressive socialist party of
Ukraine
 Social-democratic party of Ukraine
radical left
radical right
left
center
right
6.550.353     24.65 84
2.498.262 9.40 32
2.273.788 8.56 29
1.444.264 5.44 19
1.331.460 5.01 17
1.242.235 4.68 16 right
left
center
1.075.118
1.066.113
4.05
4.01
14
15 Golos Ukraini, April 8 of 1998.
16 Author’s evaluation.
17 Author’s translation.
18 Author’s translation.
19 Author’s translation.
20 Sachs, J. D. Discussion (Teranishi, Juro. Economic
recovery, growth and policies: ‘gradualism’ in the Japanese
context), Economic Policy, December 1994. —  Pp. 149—153.
21 Sachs, J. D. Discussion (Teranishi, Juro. Economic
recovery, growth and policies: ‘gradualism’ in the Japanese
context), Economic Policy, December 1994. —  Pp. 149—153.
22 Teranishi, Juro. Economic recovery, growth and policies:
‘gradualism’ in the Japanese context, Economic Policy,
December 1994. — Pp. 137—149.
23 See, for example, Arisawa, Hiromi, and Nakamura,
Takahide. Design of Postwar Economic Policies, vol. 1, Tokyo,
Tokyo University Press (in Japanese), 1990.
24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Basic Issues of Japanese
Economic Reconstruction (in Japanese), Tokyo: Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 1946.
25 Ukrainian abbreviations: kolgosp (êîëåêòèâíå ãîñïî-
äàðñòâî) — collective farm, radgosp (ðàäÿíñüêå ãîñïîäàðñò-
âî) — soviet (state) farm.
14
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Table 5. Post—war Japan and Ukraine now (comparative analysis)
3.
25
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c) “Intermidiate Stabilization” due to
gradualism (gradually lowing inflation policy) based
on foreign ODA (the main ideologist the Economic
Stabilization Board).
In general the second approach had got best of
it. When output had recovered to more then half
the prewar level (it was happened in 1949), the
Japanese government implemented the so called
“Dodge Line” — the package of stabilization
measures designed by American advisor Joseph
Dodge. In grain that was the variant of shock
therapy, including tight budget and money,
elimination of subsidies, unification of exchange
rates and so on, which is well known now as IMF-
approach. However it is important to high-light, that
shock therapy was not implemented immediately
after the war. That stands out the Japanese
approach.
The IMF-World Bank had it’s own view on the
problem, which is quite different from Japanese
approach. The major differences are summarized in
Table 6.
It could be easy to see from the table, that IMF-
World Bank is a firm supporter of shock therapy.
However, Professor J. Teranishi insists on the
inappropriateness of shock therapy to the economic
reforms of Japan. Unlike shock therapy Japan’s
gradual approach emphasized the adjustment of the
existing firms to the new circumstances.
Tatsuo Kaneda underlines the role of speed in
systemic reform: “... no overnight victory is possible
for a large change involving the entire society, like
transition to a market economy.” 28
The role of annual plans was also very important
for Japan recovery. “To rebuild the Japanese
economy from complete devastation, we need
comprehensive and concrete annual reconstruction
plans for the coming years. To speed up the
reconstruction timetable, limited resources must be
selectively used for starting an expansionary
reproduction cycle. A liberal economy wastes
economic resources and thus should not be
adopted.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 29.
Professor Juro Teranishi of the Hitotsubashi
University analyses post-war Japanese economic
growth up to 1972 and makes three conclusions 30:
1) Stable corporate ownership and governance,
and macroeconomic stability are crucial in the
transitory and growth phases.
2) New investment and its financing are crucial
to economic recovery. Intersectoral adjustment of
production in response to relative price changes
cannot be accomplished by shifts in labour alone; it
also requires capital investment.
3) The Japanese government was important in
coordinating investment in both 1946—50 period
(the phase of stabilization and rehabilitation), and
1951—55 period (the transition phase from recovery
to growth), but in different ways. In the recovery
phase, when investment was related to existing
technology and coordination of the pecuniary
externalities of investment was needed, polices such
as directed credit and price controls were effective.
In the transition phase, when investment was related
to new, imported technology, the industrial policy
of coordinating strategic shifts in production was
an effective method of intervention.
As to the last conclusion, another prominent
transition economist Professor Jeffrey Sachs,
discussing the Japan’s experience of reforms for
Table 6. Comparison of development and transition strategies. 27
27 Ohno, Kenichi. Overview: creating the market economy.
(In Japanese Views on Economic Development, edited by
Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno.— Routledge, New York and
London, 1998.— 332 p.) — 4 p.
28 Kaneda, Tatsuo. Regime and People: Revival of A Small
Country in Central Asia, Tokyo: Japan Institute of International
Affairs (in Japanees), 1995.
29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Basic Issues of Japanese
Economic Reconstruction (in Japanese), Tokyo: Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 1946.— 92 p.
30 Teranishi, Juro. Economic recovery, growth and policies:
‘gradualism’ in the Japanese context, Economic Policy,
December 1994, pp. 137—149.
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Ukraine (see J. Sachs 31), underlined, that it will
almost surely be individual entrepreneurs and
foreign investors in Ukraine who will spot the viable
opportunities for Ukraine, rather than the state
bureaucracy.
From my point of view the role of state in
Ukraine is especially specific and important. The
important distinction of contemporary Ukraine and
Japan in 1946 is that Ukraine must create it’s own
state. In comparison with Japan and European
transition countries Ukraine has to solve double
problem — to create state and market environment
simultaneously. Unfortunately, Ukrainian people
has lost any tradition of state administration during
over last 300 years of unequal union with Russia.
Government and state role in transition
One of the most important distinction of
Japanese vision of transition is crucial role of
government. Accordingly to Kenichi Ohno 32 the
active role of government is particularly important
in the early stages of development and in economic
crisis. Without wise government, an underdeveloped
economy will not take off. Government intervention
is a necessary — although definitely not sufficient —
condition for starting and sustaining economic
growth. However, the fundumental difficulty of state
and government in the developping world stems
from it’s dual role as the subject and object of
reform. The situation is analogous to a sick doctor.
In Ukraine it is aggravated by the fact that doctor
is too young. Using historical measures he is in
babyhood: state independence since 1991 in
comparison with 350 years of the national state
absence. This factor does not authorize marking the
time of Ukrainian state, but it overburden the
situation. The investigator of national state
development problems Benedict Anderson said, that
the nation-state is the only effective implementing
unit for economic development of latecomers. But
the nation-state is not something that naturally
emerges in any society. Rather, it is often an
“imagined community” created by government for
the pursuit of certain goals. Nationalism and
technological progress have played key roles in its
formation process.33
Ukrainian state appeared on the wave of
transition to market economy, but national
Ukrainian consciousness has not formed yet. It
needs a time.
The role of state and government can be
classified by the next table (Table 7) 34.
According to Timothy Frye and Andrei Shleifer,
the survey organized in Moscow and Warsaw shops
gave the evidence points to the relatively greater
relevance of the invisible-hand model to describe Po-
land, and of grabbing-hand model to describe
Russia.
Unfortunately, I am not acquainted with similar
direct investigations (if any exists) dealing with
classification of role of the Ukrainian state and
government in market economy construction.
However, ugly growth of unofficial economy in
Ukraine (see Table 3, p. 6, and Figure 1, p. 6) do
not give an opportunity to conclude that Ukrainian
state is much better in civilized market creation than
Russian one. Furthermore, the Table 3 says that the
share of the unofficial economy in Ukrainian GDP
(48.9) is bigger, than in Russian one (41.6 %).
So, using the terms by Timothy Frye and Andrei
Shleifer we can say that grabbing-hand model is the
most appropriate model of Ukrainian state in
transition process. From my point of view, it is the
core of transition problem in Ukraine.
Table 7. Economic Role of the State During Transition
31 Sachs, J. D. Discussion (Teranishi, Juro. Economic
recovery, growth and policies: ‘gradualism’ in the Japanese
context), Economic Policy, December 1994.— 149—153.
32 Ohno, Kenichi. Overview: creating the market economy.
(In Japanese Views on Economic Development, edited by
Kenichi Ohno and Izumi Ohno.— Routledge, New York and
London, 1998.— 332 p.— 7 p.
33 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections
on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, 1983.
34 Frye, Timothy and Shleifer, Andrei. The Invisible Hand
and The Grabbing Hand, American Economic Review, May
1997, 87 (2), pp. 354—358.
Model Legal environment Regulatory environment
Invisible hand
Government is no above law and uses
power to supply minimal public goods.
Courts enforce contracts.
Government follows rules. Regulation is
minimal. Little corruption.
Helping-hand
Government is above law but uses
power to help business. State official
enforce contracts.
Government aggressively regulates to
promote some businesses. Organized
corruption.
Grabbing-hand
 Government is above law and uses
power to extract rents. The legal
system does not work. Mafia replaces
state as enforcer.
Predatory regulations. Disorganized
corruption.
12 ÍÀÓÊÎÂ² ÇÀÏÈÑÊÈ. Òîì 6. ÅÊÎÍÎÌ²ÊÀ
Now we could give a short answer on the
questions stated above. Tatsuo Kaneda 35 criticized
the Russian policy in Transition. A lot of this critics
could be applied directly or modified to Ukrainian
economic state policy. First of all there was no long-
term state target vision of the market economy was
provided. To be more accurately, there was not
common vision among the government and the
Parliament. Second, political aspects of the reforms
were ignored. Third, transition to market economy
as a socio-engineering task was thought to be
completed within a few years. Transition to market
economy as an economic task was the same way
minded. It was expected the growth beginning in a
few years and output recovering automatically. And
at least, a very important miscarriage, was that
transition process was incorrectly assumed to induce
immediate change in the behavior of individuals and
firms.
The behavior of individuals and firms is just
what I’d like to concentrate on hereinafter. Namely,
the behavior of individuals and firms begot such
political and economic situation in Ukraine as we
have spoken above. That is the biggest Ukrainian
paradox: the state administration, government and
parliament have been appeared as result of
democracy. The President and Parliament of
Ukraine were elected by people, and the President
has appointed the government. So, imperfect
Ukrainian state and government are the product of
the popular will!
However why Ukrainian people prefers the
representatives of left parties as deputies of the
Parliament, who brake the reforms?
To answer this question and series of others we
need to study transition on micro-level, in particular,
behavior of individuals.
Worker behavior under different social-economic
environments
Why is Japanese working time so long?
Akira Kawaguchi
Standard model
One of the most famous idea of Adam Smith is
that the commonwealth of nations depends not from
the quantity of gold, but on how productively and
effectively a simple worker works.
Hence, the behavior of workers under different
conditions, their reaction on incentives, stimulus,
remuneration, taxes, social environment is the core
of economic theory.
Recall one variant of a classical model, which
describes worker’s behavior. The main assumptions
of the model are the following:
1. The individual’s utility level depends on
income and labor activity.
2. An individual can change his labor activity.
3. Wage rate for any unit of work is constant.
4. “Income-labor activity” combination con-
forms to the social security principles.
In this model, the worker chooses his or her
income and labor activities in order to maximize the
welfare. The model of labor supply can be written
as
where
w is the wage (or remuneration) rate;
I0 is non—labor income;
I is the individual’s total income;
L is the desired quantity of labor supplied;
u(I, L) is the individual’s utility function whose
arguments are income and quantity of labor
supplied;
ℵ is the set of “labor activity — income”
combinations which are in agreement with social
security principle.
The model of labor supply can be represented
in the following graph:
In Figure 2, the following notations were used:
L
max
 is maximum quantity of labor activity;
U
1
, U
2
, U
3 
… are the indifference curves defined
on the couples “Income — Labor activity”36;
Labor (L)
Income (I)
U1
U2
U3
U3 > U2 > U1
Lmax
I = wL
L*
I*
Figure 2. Equilibrium of individual worker without non—
labor income
35 Kaneda, Tatsuo. Regime and People: Revival of A Small
Country in Central Asia, Tokyo: Japan Institute of International
Affairs (in Japanees), 1995.
( ) ( )u I L I wL I I LI L, max, , , ;, → ≤ + ∈ℵ0
36 Indifference curve contains the combinations of income
and labor activity which yield equivalent or identical welfare
level from the worker’s point of view. The graph shows typical
form of indifference curves, reflecting standard assumptions
about preference of working individuals. Among them are the
following:
1) a worker can choose the most preferable combinations
“income — labor” from two possible;
2) a worker prefers to work less, and to earn more (axiom
of monotony);
3) each additional unit of work activity requires more
remuneration (raising of the marginal rate of substitute of
income for labor).
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L* is the equilibrium labor supply;
I* is the equilibrium income.
Economic theory and applied economics have
studied the reaction of a worker to different changes
in remuneration, taxes, non—labor income, social—
economic environment and so on. The Figure 3
represents the behavior of a worker if she/he receives
non—labor income.
Non—labor income, subsistence income and behavior of worker
Labor economics proposed one well known
conclusion about the behavior of worker. According
to numerous theoretical and applied investigations
when wage (remuneration) increases, then a labor
supply increases to up certain value, and than
decreases (see, Ashenfelter O. and Heckman J. J. 37,
Borjas G. J. and Heckman, J. J. 38, Hausman J. A. 39,
Hicks J. R. 40, Hyman D. N. 41 and others). This fact
can be illustrated by the next graph (see Figure 4).
Untutored explanation of the form of the curve
on the Figure 4 is that worker with small income is
interested to earn more, but one with essential
income is able to buy leisure, or equivalently, to work
less.
Let us elaborate on the standard model by
adding such the important parameter, as subsistence
income. Subsistence income refers to the minimal
level of income which a worker must receive in order
to survive.
Let L
max
 is the maximum quantity of labor
supply, and I
min
 be the subsistence income. In this
case the feasible set of “income — labor” combi-
nations can be represented by the shaded area
(Figure 5).
Consider two principal cases dealing with non—
labor income.
I. Non-labor income is greater than the sub-
sistence income;
II.Non-labor income is less than the subsistence
income.
The last case is shown on Figure 6.
The Figure 6 very clearly proves that if sub-
sistence income is greater than non-labor one, then
the reducing of remuneration, in particular, wage,
raises the quantity of labor supplied by the worker.
This fact can be represented on Figure 7.
From our point of view, the behavior of worker
represented in Figure 7 is unusual for developed
market oriented country but is a distinctive feature
Figure 3. Worker equilibrium with non—labor income
Labor (L)
Income (I)
U1
U2
U3
U3 > U2 > U1
Lmax
I = wL
L*
I*
Labor (L)
bL1 L2L3
Wage (or
remuneration) (w)
w1
w2
w3
Figure 4. Typical dependence labor supply on wage (or
remuneration)
Labor (L)
Lmax
Imin
Income (I)
Figure 5. Feasible set in the case of the income restriction
In accordance with these assumptions the indifference
curve U
3
 contains more preferable “income — labor” combi-
nations than U
2
, and, in turn, U
2
  more preferable than U
1
.
37 Ashenfelter, O., and Heckman, J.J., «The Estimation of
Income and Substitution of Income and Substitution Effects
in a Model of Family Labor Supply», Econometrica, 42:1,
January 1974,  pp. 73—86.
38 Borjas, George J., and Heckman, James J, «Labor
Supply Estimates of Public Policy Evaluation», in Working
Paper NO. 299, Cambridge: National Bureau of  Economic
Research, November 1978.
39 Hausman, Jerry A, Labor Supply, in Aaron, Henry J.,
Pechman, Joseph A., «How Taxes affect Economic Behavior»,
Washington, D.C.: The Brooking Institution, 1981, pp. 27—84.
40 Hicks, J.R, «The Theory of Wages», MacMillan:
London, 1932.
41 Hyman, David N., «Public Finance: A contemporary
Application of Theory to Policy», 2nd  Edition, Chicago: The
Dryden Pres. 1987, pp. 211—216.
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of countries with total state ownership and countries
at the beginning of transition process. If some agent
(the state) is a monopsonist of labor, then the worker
loses the possibility to choose and change job. She/he
must work more intensively to survive as the
monopsonist reduces remuneration. I would like to
emphasize two important features of total state
ownership, which implies similar dependence of
labor supply on remuneration. These are:
1) monopsony in the labor market, the absence
of alternatives for workers;
2) the absence (or small amount) of non—labor
income.
In developed countries, non-labor income for
the majority of the population can be very sub-
stantial, because it can be income from ownership,
subsidies, large pensions, etc. In the centrally
planned and some transition countries, for instance,
Ukraine, non-labor income is not able to afford
workers modest living standards, consequently, they
have to increase their labor activity in response to
reduction in remuneration.
Comparative analysis of Labor supply for different values of
non—labor income
Under very reasonable assumptions behavior of
workers can be simulated, using some optimization
problems 42 (see, Appendix A. Worker behavior
model incorporating Geary — Stone’ utility
function, Model, p. 22). One of results of simulation
is reproduced in Figure 8.
Parameter α means the propensity to work,
1 − α — the propensity to leisure (i.e., not work).
By the way, A. Kawaguchi 43 used two values
for propensity to earn for “average” Japanese, i.e.,
0.85 and 0.6. According to T. Kinoshita 44 the α for
the average Japanese is equal 0.85.
Labor (L)
Lmax
Wage or
remuneration
(w)
Figure 7. Labor supply dependence on wage (remuneration)
in the case when non—labor income is less than subsistence
income
Labor (L)Lmax
Imin
Income (I)
I0
I = w1L + I0
I = w2L + I0
I = w3L + I0
w1 > w2 > w3
L(w1) L(w2) L(w3)
Figure 6. Labor supply and remuneration in the case when
non—labor income is less than subsistence income
Figure 8. Dependence of labor supply on remuneration at
different values of non—labor income (I0(1), I0(2), …)
Labor (L)
Wage (or
remuneration) (w) I
0(1) > I0(2) > I0(3) = Imin >
>I0(4)> I0(5) = 0
α Lmax Lmax
I0(3)
I0(4)
I0(2)
I0(1)
I0(5)
42 Yastremsky O. A Comparative Analysis of Labor Supply
and Welfare Level  in Different Social-Economic Environments,
Ukrainian Economic Review, 1996, v. II (3), Philadelphia,
pp. 53—72.
43 Kawaguchi, Akira. Why is Japanese working time so
long?: Wage-working time contract models, The Japanese
Economic Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, September 1996, pp. 251—
270.
44 Kinoshita, T. Rodo Jikan to Chingin no Keizigaku
(Economics of Working Time and Wages, in Japanese), Tokyo :
Chuo Keizaisha, 1990.
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Remuneration for labor under socialism
Socialism refers to a system of the state
ownership of capital. Few changes have taken place
in Ukraine and other countries of the former USSR
with respect to this fact. The opinion exists that
political dictatorship and direct compulsion were the
basis of this system. With regard to labor stimulation
(which interests any system) the socialistic state had
and has powerful economic levers based on the
state’s possession of jobs in the labor market which
permits it to set monopsonistic wages. “Labor
heroism”, “enthusiasm” of the past years are
explained, by among other reasons, low wage rates
and the absence of other sources of income (I0 < a
or I0 = 0). The striking example of obliged labor
heroism was described by Russian writer Alexander
Soljenitstin in “One day of Ivan Denisovich”
(“Îäèí äåíü Èâàíà Äåíèñîâè÷à”). The prisoners
tried to work hard because they were afraid of the
reduction of food ration.
Tax policy under centrally planned economy and
in the infancy of transition
Once again, consider Figure 6 (21 p.), and
imagine that w means “net” remuneration after
taxation. Suppose the simplest assumption that tax
is given by
w = (1 — γ)    ,
where
γ is the proportional tax on labor income;
    is the remuneration for labor.
A rise in the tax rate has the same effect on labor
activity as the reduction in remuneration, i.e., labor
activity increases, because a worker must “eke out
an existence”.
This situation is possible under total state
ownership (Centrally Planned Economy and the
infancy of Transition). Tax income can be re-
presented by Figure 9.
The form of tax income dependence on tax is
essentially different in comparison with the well
known Laffer curve. Spend attention must be given
to the critical point on Figure 9. If the tax rate is
greater than some critical value, the worker will not
able to pay tax and, at the same time, earn her/his
living.
Appendix A. “Worker behavior model in-
corporating Geary — Stone” utility function”
contains the “Statement 2” (22 p.), which formally
proves the form of tax income curve in Figure 9.
Worker behavior under group and total ownership
incentives
Corporation: an ingenious device for obtaining
individual profit without individual responsibility.
Ambrose Bierce
Les hommes ont pour l’egalité une passion
ardente, insatiable, eternelle, invincible
A. de Tocqueville
An example
Consider an utopian situation of a joint activity
society of workers. Each worker tries to earn some
income, but income in society is distributed
according to the Result Leveling Principle. This
principle of remuneration for labor is more or less a
typical feature of socialism experiments during
different periods. This principle is manifested most
clearly in R. Owen’s New Harmony 45, Chinese
communes, the military communism period and the
initial period of Kolkhoz system in the USSR. (To
our mind, leveling is a genetically inherent quality
of socialism in general, but in more complex and
whimsical forms).
To explain the Result Leveling Principle let us
consider a simple example. Suppose a commune is
made up of ten participants. Assume, during a day,
each worker’s earning is given as follows:
10, 5, 3, 15, 4, 11, 9, 8, 4, 5 (thousand yen).
According to the pure Result Leveling Principle,
remuneration for each worker will be
(10 + 5 + 3 + 15 + 4 + 11 + 9 + 8 + 4 + 5)/10 = 7.4
This principle is also named (pure) egalitarian
principle.
Let us assume that each worker worked for 8
hours. So, the hourly wage of each worker is given
as follows
10/8 = 1.25, 5/8 = 0.625, 0.375, 1.875, 0.5, 1.375,
1.125, 1, 0.5, 0.625.
Suppose that the tenth worker decided to
increase his income by working an additional hour
(i.e., by working a total 9 hours in particular day).
When the tenth worker worked only 8 hours, he
Figure 9. Tax Revenue if non-labor income is less than
subsistence income
Tax Revenue
Tax (γ)
1
critical point
~w
~w
45Robert Owen (1771—1825) one of  Utopists who tried to
do some socialist experiments, in particular, organizing the
commune New Harmony. The incentives to work of the
members of  commune  were characterized as wage-leveling
principles. This experiment had have failure.
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earned 7.4 (thousand yen). When she/he worked one
additional hour, he would earn
(10 + 5 + 3 + 15 + 4 + 11 + 9 + 8 + 4 + (5 + 5/8))/
10 = 7.4 + (5/8)/10 = 7.4 + 0.0625 = 7.4625
Hence, the tenth worker were to increase his
labor activity by one hour he will earn an
additional 62.5 yen instead of 625 = (5.000/8) yen
while she/he would have earned if she/he were
work individually.
Budget lines
Using the previous numerical example, the
budget line for a worker can be constructed.
Consider again the 10th worker. Her/his budget lines
under individual and group incentives could be
represented in Figure 10.
In general case the budget lines are shown in
Figure 11, where q
s
 is ability of worker s to earn per
one unit of time).
One line reflects consumed income dependence
on labor activity for the worker s, who is working
individually. Other line — for worker, who works
under the Results Leveling System.
Figure 11 shows in relief that each additional
unit of labor activity under the Result Leveling
System “drowns” in the big caldron of commune.
So, the preliminary analysis hints that additional
labor efforts are not profitable from individual
welfare point of view.
Worker behavior under group remuneration
See the next figure (Figure 12).
The individual forecasts to diminish her/his
labor activity in the commune without essentially
diminishing her/his income while essentially
increasing her/his welfare (moving from the
equilibrium point IE to the point TCE, which is
located on the budget line TCBL).
However, each individual is similar minded, and
the labor activity of each is decreasing. The result
of non cooperative actions of individuals in
commune is to shift the budget line TCBL to SCBL.
This is represented by a move from TCE to SCE.
So, the labor activity in total state sector implies
a total shirking.
Labor supply depending on number of workers in group
Using the graphical illustrations, the previous
item grounds principal possibility of shirking under
group incentives (state ownership). Theoretical
results of studying of workers behavior under group
incentives gives the opportunity to show labor
supply dependence on the number of workers in
commune (see Statement 5, 22 p.).
Let us consider N identical employees working
under group incentives. The Figure 13 illustrates a
desire of workers to shirk the work under the Results
Leveling System.
If system of workers’ preferences satisfies certain
very natural assumptions (see footnote 36, p. 12), it
is possible to prove some formal results dealing with
peculiarities of workers behavior under group
(Results Leveling System). The AppendixB.
“Workers behavior under group (Results Leveling
System) incentives” contains these results.
The main sense of the Statement 3 (22 p.) and
Statement 4 (22 p.) is proving that the level of
shirking increases in state sector as the number of
workers community increases.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
income under individual
remuneration
income under group
remuneration
Labor 
(hours)
Income (1.000 
yens)
Figure 10. Worker income under individual and group
remuneration
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Figure 11. Budget lines under individual and group
remuneration
Labor
Income
IE
TCE
SCE
IBL
TCBL
SCBL
Figure 12. Work shirking under Results Leveling System
(IBL — individual budget line, TCBL — tactic budget line of
individual, who works in commune (under the Results Leveling
System), SCBL — strategic budget line of individual, who works
in commune, IE — individual equilibrium, TCE — tactic
equilibrium of individual, who works in commune, SCE —
strategic equilibrium of individual, who works in commune).
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Also the Figure 13 illustrates that the labor
supply of each worker strives to minimal level (level
providing a subsistence income, that is, subsistence
income divided on the ability to earn 46), if the
number of workers increases.
The model of non state (alternative) sector suppression
Similar effects are well known in the theory of
public economics, club theory, firm theory (see,
Nalbantian, H. R. and Schotter, A. 47, Nalbuff,
B. and Sansing, R. 48, Ray, D. and Ueda, K. 49,
Barham, V. ; Boadway, R. ; Marchand M. and
Pestieau, P. 50, Harsanyi, J. C. 51 and the rest).
Shirking under group incentives is one result of the
theory of non cooperative games by J. Nash (see,
Nash, J. F. 52). J. Nash proved that the Nash equilib-
rium is not Pareto optimal.
My result allows for investigation of level of
shirking subject to other parameters. For instance,
some our formulas give an opportunity to establish
level of shirking according to the number of workers
in commune, subsistence income, income from
alternative (non state) sector.
The results described above can also be used to
estimate the effect of privatization.
There are numerous investigations in which
authors studied labor productivity under group
incentives, and methods of elimination of shirking and
free riding (see, Nalbantian, H. R. and Schotter, A. 53,
Calvo, G. A. and Wellisz, S. H. 54, Chen, Y. and Plot,
C. R. 55). Among the proposed methods are:
1) Revenue Sharing;
2) Target Based Schemes Forcing Contracts;
3) Profit Sharing;
4) Gainsharing;
5) Tournament-Based Schemes: Competitive Teams;
6) Individualistic Schemes: Monitoring (see,
Nalbantian, H. R. and Schotter, A. 56);
1) The Groves-Ledyard mechanism (see, Chen,
Y. and Plot, C. R. 57).
I have studied a special case fighting against
shirking under centrally planned economy and
proposed an appropriate method. This method is
important, because it gives an opportunity to
evaluate a more realistic initial point of the
Transition — centrally planned economy.
Let us consider the Center, which tries to
maximize tax income, and community of workers
under Results Leveling System.
The next graphs show dependence of the Center
tax income on proportional tax rate.
Figure 13. Labor supply depended on number of workers
in group (1 is maximum of labor activity)
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46 In our case subsistence income is 175, and the ability to
earn is 300. So, the minimal level of labor supply providing the
subsistence income is 175/300 = 0.5833
47 Nalbantian, H. R. and Schotter, A. Productivity Under
Group Incentives: An Experimental Study, American Economic
Review, June 1997, 87 (3), pp. 314—341.
48 Nalbuff, B. and Sansing, R. The Rationally Shrinking
Union, Economics and Politics, Vol. 8, March 1996, No 1, pp.
51—59.
49 Ray, Debray and Ueda, Kaoru. Egalitarianism and
Incentives, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 71, Number
2, November 1996, pp. 324—348.
50 Barham, V.; Boadway, R.; Marchand M. and Pestieau, P.
Volunteer work and club size: Nash equilibrium and optimality,
Journal of Public Economics, volume 65, No 1, July 1997, pp.
9—22.
51 Harsanyi, J. C, Rational Behavior and Bargaining
Equilibrium  in  Games and Social Situations, Cambridge
University Press, 1988, p. 314.
52 Nash, J.F., «Non-cooperative Games», Annals of
Mathematics, 54, 1951, pp. 286—295.
53 Nalbantian, H. R. and Schotter, A. Productivity Under
Group Incentives: An Experimental Study, American Economic
Review, June 1997, 87 (3), pp. 314—341.
54 Calvo, G. A. and Wellisz, S. H. Supervision, Loss of
Control, and the Optimum size of the Firm, Journal of Political
Economy, October 1978, 86 (5), pp. 943—952
55 Chen Y. and Plot C.R. The Groves-Ledyard mechanism:
An experimental study of institutional design, Journal of Public
Economics, vol. 59, No 3, March 1996, pp. 335—364.
56 Nalbantian, H. R. and Schotter, A. Productivity Under
Group Incentives: An Experimental Study, American Economic
Review, June 1997, 87 (3), pp. 314—341.
57 Chen, Y. and Plot C. R. The Groves-Ledyard
mechanism: An experimental study of institutional design,
Journal of Public Economics, volume 59, No 3, March 1996,
pp. 335—364.
Figure 14. The Center tax income (the income from non
state sector does not exist)
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The Figure 14 and Figure 15 imply two very
important cases for the Center:
1) income from non state sector is greater than
subsistence income (I0 > I
min
);
2) income from non state sector is less than
subsistence income (I0 < I
min
).
Analysis tells us that, for large N tax income at
Io> I
min
 is much less than at Io < I
min
. Dependence of
the Center Profit (Tax Income) on the level of non
state sector income is shown on the Figure 17.
So, self-interested Center is not interested non
state income above subsistence income. If non state
income is greater then subsistence income, and
number of workers is sufficiently large, then shirking
in state sector transforms into dominating strategy,
and the self-interested Center will lose a livelihood.
One possible way for the Center to survive is to
depress non state income of workers.
Hence, the crucial assumption of our analysis is
the possibility of the Center to destroy the alterna-
tive, i.e. non state sector. In different periods of the
Soviet system existence the Center used different
methods of non state sector suppression. Let us make
the simplest assumption, that the Center can spend
some part of its profit to suppress non state sector, or
where
I(c, x) is level of non state sector income;
c is state expenditures used for non state sector
suppression (KGB expenditures);
K is the reduction of non state sector income
per one unit of the KGB expenditures, or other
words, marginal expenditures of non—state sector
suppression
ξ is random variable.
Using the assumption (3) and supposing that
the Central Planner is neutral to risk, the problem
of the Center maximizing its expected utility profit
was formulated (see Appendix C. “The model of non
state (alternative) sector suppression”, 23 p.).
The problem of optimal suppression of non state
sector has been studied under different combinations
of parameters. For the Center the most important
case is I
min
 < I0, that is income from non state sector
is greater than the subsistence income. At this case
without suppression of non state sector the Center
Figure 17. Tax Revenue and Income from non state sector
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Figure 18. The Center Expected Profit, the Possibility of
excess expenditures (c > 54) on non state sector suppression
(I
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 = 175, I0 = 200, L
max
 = 1, q = 300)
Figure 15. The Center tax revenue (the income from non
state sector is greater than subsistence income)
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Figure 16. The Center tax revenue if non state income is
less or greater than subsistence income
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can not survive, because shirking of state sector
destroys the possibility to collect the tax.
Under the assumptions made above, it is
possible to calculate Expected Center Profit (see
Figure 18 and Figure 19).
The effectiveness of suppression of non state
sector essentially depends on the parameter K, which
can be interpreted as necessary expenditures for
reducing non state sector income. Figure 18 and
Figure 19 illustrate this fact. They show that with a
more effective suppression apparatus, the optimum
of the Expected Profit Center is greater.
Figure 18 also tells us that the excess expenditure
on suppression apparatus can destroy the Center
Profit (c > 54).
Figure 18 and Figure 19 show that there exist
values of parameters (expenditures of non state
sector income suppression per unit, level of
uncertainty, non state sector income) at which the
Results Leveling System can survive. Similarly, there
exist values of parameters at which this System is
not able to survive, and the Expected Center Profit
is negative. The latter case is shown in the next figure.
The main theoretical conclusion from the above
model of the Results Leveling System including
expenditures on non state sector suppression is the
following: in spite of strong workers’ incentives to
shirk in total state sector, the Results Leveling
System can survive under some conditions. The
clearest case of this is when I0 < I
min
, that is, subsistece
income is greater than non state sector (alternative
sector) income. In opposite case, I0 > I
min
 (that is,
non state sector income is greater than subsistence
income) the System is fateful if it does not undertake
effective measures to suppress the non state sector.
Lastly, if the difference between the non state sector
income and subsistence income, and expenditures
on suppression of non state sector are not very big,
then the Results Leveling System can survive.
Applications of the theoretical results
The success of Left Parties during the March of 1998
election to Ukrainian Parliament
In accordance with forecast of Ukrainian and
foreign experts the left parties achieved essential
success during last election to the Ukrainian
parliament (see Table 4, p. 7).
The results are discouraging and enigmatical.
They seem to suggest that, the Ukrainian people
were very happy and satisfied with the socialism
system? Quite the opposite picture emerges from
official data which indicate that the Ukrainians were
the ones who suffered the most from the socialist
system.
Using theoretical models, let us try to under-
stand the magnetism of socialism slogan for simple
people, in particular for Ukrainian people.
Standard assumptions about the behavior of
workers found that, for some individuals, the
participation in commune is profitable. Really, see
on the Figure 12 (15 p.). It can also illustrate not
only the shirking the total state sector, but also the
tactic magnetism and strategic disutility of socialism.
At the first blush, the benefit of participation in
the Results Leveling System for the individual is
obvious: working less, receiving almost the same
income (moving from the equilibrium point IE to
the point TÑE, which is located on the budget line
TCBL). However, this commune advantage is only
an illusion because each individual is similar minded,
and the labor activity of each is decreasing (a move
from TCE to SÑE). The System is degrading, and
the welfare of each participants of commune is
decreasing. The participation in the Results Leveling
System from strategic (long — run) point view is
destructive for each worker.
Figure 12 (15 p.) illustrates the trap of socialism
slogans: short-run advantages and long-run
disutility. Unfortunately, the significant part of
Figure 19. The Center Expected Profit (I
min
 = 175, Io =
200, L
max
 = 1, q = 300)
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Ukrainian voters are in the trap of illusions of short-
run advantage.
Next question which arises is why Ukrainian
people do not realize their own long-run interests.
This question is really in the crux of understanding
the Ukrainian transition process. One preliminary
explanation is that the mentality of soviet people
can not be transformed immediately, and soviet
consumer and worker lost an ability to understand
their strategic and long-run interest because they
suffered from the different factors. Among these
are:
1) parallels markets;
2) rationing;
3) pervasive queuing;
4) highly uncertain value of money resulting
from the fact that consumers could not accurately
predict when they would have to turn to the second
economy for basic purchases 58.
The infancy of the Transition
The Soviet system collapse
The Transition from Centrally planned to
Market economy is mainstream of contemporary
economic thought. According to historical point
of view the Transition is one of the links in the chain:
Centrally Planned Economy — Collapse of the
Centrally Planned Economy — Transition —
Market Economy.
Numerous economists have tried to describe and
explain the nature of this process from different
point of view using different methods of description
and analysis (see Yujiro Hayami 59, Gisela Meyer
Escoa 60, Jan Adam 61, Marie Lavigne 62, Bryan W.
Roberts and Alvarado Rodriguez 63, John Gibson
and Philip Hanson 64, Alla Fridman 65, Robert
C. Allen66, Mathias Dewatripont and Gerard
Roland 67, Olivier Blanchard 68, Jeffrey D. Sachs 69,
S. Fisher, R. Sanay, C. Vegh 70, Â. È. Àðêèí,
À. Ä. Ñëàñòíèêîâ 71, Anders Aslund 72 and many
others).
According to our investigations, a Centrally
planned economy can be characterized by two
crucial features:
1) total shirking in state sector, and
2) specific methods of suppression of non—state
sector (which is alternative to state sector).
From our point of view the collapse of Soviet
system was not and is not puzzling. The puzzle was
and continues to be the following: “Why did this
System exist so long?”
The method of shirking suppression, which is
described above, explained why the Centrally
planned economy (of Soviet type) has survived
nearly 70 years.
The suppression of non state sector as method
of a fight against total shirking is useful for
understanding the Soviet system collapse. After
Helsinki agreement a large part of soviet people
received legal opportunity to leave the Soviet system
by emigration. In the end of the nineties the 4th
paragraph of the Soviet Constitution was delited.
This paragraph constitutes the leading role of the
Communist party in life of society. The results of
these events were:
I. greater availability of alternative to state
sector;
II.the Central self-interested planner lost the
possibility to suppress non state sector using such
apparatus as communist party and KGB.
The Soviet Centrally planned economy was
fateful.
Output falling down
During the first years after the collapse of the
Centrally planned economy the state sector
continues to dominate, although the methods of
58 Acharya A., Spagat M. A General Model of the Soviet
Consumer, Journal of Comparative Economics, 1995, 20, 3, pp.
302—315.
59 Hayami, Yujiro. Japan in the new world confrontation:
a historical perspective, The Japanese Economic Review, Vol.
46, No. 4, December 1995, pp. 351—357.
60 Escoa, Gisela Meyer. The Demise of Soviet Industry: A
Regional Perspective, Journal of Comparative Economics,
Volume 21, Number 3, 1995, pp. 336—352.
61 Adam, Jan. Why did the Socialist System Collapse in
Central and East European Countries? The case of Poland, the
Former Czechoslovakia, and Hungry. New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1996. xiii + 234 p.
62 Lavigne, Marie. Russia and Eastern Europe: Is
Transition Over?, Journal of Comparative Economics, Volume
23, Number 1, 1996, pp. 20—37.
63 Roberts, Bryan W. and Rodriguez, Alvarado. Economic
Growth under a Self-Interested Central Planner and Transition
to a Market Economy, Journal of Comparative Economics,
Volume 24, Number 2, 1997, pp. 121—139.
64 Gibson, John and Hanson, Philip, Eds. Transformation
from Below: Local Power and the Political Economy of Post-
Communist Transitions. Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1996.
ix + 330 pp.
65 Fridman, Alla. Privatization and Price Liberalization:
Comparative Analysis, Journal of Comparative Economics,
Volume 24, Number 3, 1997, pp. 313—334.
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4, October 1997, pp. 387—410.
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suppression of shirking were soon after exhausted.
This can be used to explain the “stylized fact” that
the production diminished (i.e., output fell during
the first years of the transition.
(Hyper)Inflation
One of very important and unpleasant features
of transition economies is inflation and, in some
cases, hyperinflation. Ukraine suffered from
hyperinflation during 1992—95 years. The main
reasons of hyperinflation are:
• inactivity of government in restructuring of
enormous large state sector;
• traditional labor forces shirking from work
in state sector;
• development of democracy and the break-
down of the suppression of non state sector as
method of a fight against total shirkin;
• government artificial methods of “pouring oil
on troubled waters” among different groups of
employees in state sector using salary increasing by
expand money supply by printing machine.
Conclusions
The results of our research can be summarized
as follows.
1. Microeconomic consequences of macro-
decisions are very important for understanding of
transition process.
2. Behavior of micro units, in particular, of workers
could not be changed immediately. One of the reasons
is inertia, traditionalism and adherence to metier;
another — initial conditions of labor activity.
3. Subsistence, non labor income and income
from non state sector (alternative to state sector)
play crucial role in behavior of workers under
Centrally planned economy and Transition.
4. The sunset of Centrally planned economy and
the infancy of the Transition entail the existence of
large strata of people on the margin of poverty and
survival.
5. So, their behavior differs from the behavior
of workers in developed countries with stable
economies.
6. The crucial peculiarities of initial point of the
Transition, Centrally planned economy, are:
i) total shirking in state sector, and
ii) specific methods of suppression of non—state
sector (which is alternative to state sector).
7. The self-interested Center is not able to
survive without specific methods of suppression the
alternative to state sector.
8. Democracy development disables the methods
of non-state sector suppression. At the same time,
economy is not restructured to the market style. So,
output falling down is unavoidable features of the
first stages of the infancy of Transition.
9. Governments (state administrations) without
statehood experience (for instance, Ukrainian
government, parliament, and state administration)
do not possess long-run vision and, engendering
inflation and hyperinflation, try to organize illusion
of incentives for different sector of archaic state
economy.
10. People of transition countries without
statehood traditions also are not accustomed to
long-run vision of their own interests. So, success of
leftist parties, which promise government support
for all comers, is very possible.
11. Main problems for contemporary Ukraine
are formation of own statehood, national con-
sciousness and long-run vision engrafting in feeling
of people and state administration.
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Formal model
The Pure Result leveling system can be described
by system of individual utility functions:
(10)
where
L
s
 is labor supply of worker s,
q
s
 work ability of worker s per one unit of time.
According to (10) individual income is some
“simple” average of total product of community.
An important peculiarity of the (10) is that the
result (i.e., output) is common for each worker, but
labor efforts are individual.
The nature of total state ownership is reflected
by the next crucial assumption that the equilibrium
of workers with utility function (10) is described by
a non cooperative game (i. e., by the Nash
equilibrium). So, if ℵ
s
 is feasible set of labor supply
for worker s, then equilibrium is defined by the
following relation: U
s
(L
1
*,..., L
s-1
*, L
s
*, L
s+1
*,...L
N
*)
 ≥
U
s
(L
1
*,..., L
s-1
*, L
s
, L
s+1
*,...L
N
*)
Model
u(I, L) = (I — I
min) ∝ (Lmax — L)1 − ∝ → max,
I ≤ (1 — γ)wL + I0,
I
 ≥ I
min, 0 ≤ L ≤ Lmax,
(4)
where
I is the individual’s total income (variable);
L is the desired quantity of labor supplied
(variable);
w is the wage rate or remuneration level;
I
min
 is the subsistence income;
L
max
 is the maximum level of labor activity;
I0 is the non—labor income;
u(I, L) is the individual’s utility function, whose
arguments are income and quantity of labor
supplied;
α  is the propensity to earn;
γ  is the tax rate on labor income.
The solution of the model (4) at γ = 0 is
characterized entirely by
Statement 1 73
If
(5)
then problem (4) at has not feasible solution.
Appendix A. Worker behavior model incorporating Geary - Stone’ utility function
( )L L I I
w
* max ,
max
min
= − −
−
0 1
0
α α
If
(6)
then
L* = L
max
, I* = I
min .
if
L
max 
w + I0 > I
min,
then
(8)
Statement 2
Let the inequality (7) be fulfilled. The maximum
proportional tax rate is
and
(9)
where (L(γ), I(γ)) is the solution of problem (4)
that depends on γ. The proof of the statement 2
follows immediately from statement 1, if we let w
(1 − γ) ~w .
for , and for each s = 1, …, N.
For worker s, L
s
* is the best strategy (i.e., will
give at least as high u as L
s
), taking into con-
sideration the behavior (strategy) of other workers.
Some modifications of the model (10)-(11) are
also possible. For instance, model with non labor
income.
Study r-replica of community of workers with
next labor abilities and utility functions:
where   and  for all t = 1, …, r.
Consider the function,
where q
s
 > 0 ∀ s, and the problem
Appendix B. Workers behavior under group (Results Leveling System) incentives
min , min
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73 Yastremsky O. A Comparative Analysis of Labor Supply
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Ukrainian Economic Review, 1996, v. II (3), Philadelphia, pp.
53—72.
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Statement 3
Let u
s
(I, L) ∀ s be
(i) defined on the set {(I, L): I
 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ L ≤ L
max
};
(ii) is a concave (pseudo-concave) function ∀ s;
(iii) is a continuously differentiable function ∀ s;
(iv)
Let r increase. Then r exists for which L
1
*, …,
L
rN
* = 0 are the Nash equilibrium.
Main sense of statement is the proof of work
shirking in state sector.
Other variants of statement 3 are possible.
For instance, main result remains in force not only
for the Pure Results Leveling System, but also for
the Fair Results Leveling System, where equal share
1/N is changed into fair share c
s
. One of possible
way of “fair” share definition is         .
Statement 3 is not true for some commonly used
utility functions, for example for Stone — Geary
utility functions because the latter contains essential
goods. Statement 4 gives an opportunity to
introduce “aversion” to state sector for this type of
utility functions.
Consider indifference curve
u(I, L) = u,
and the implicit function I(L, u). Together they
define the following equation:
u(I(L, u), L) = u.
Statement 4
Let u(I, L) be
(i) defined on set U = {(I, L): I ³ 0, 0 £ L £ L
max
} ;
(ii) concave (pseudo-concave) on the set U;
(iii) continuously differentiable ∀ I > 0;
(iv) non-decreasing in I and non-increasing in
L; strictly increasing in I and strictly decreasing in
L ∀ I > 0 income is an essential good, that is u(I,
L
max
) > u(0, 0) ∀ I > 0;
(v) MRS
I, L
 (0, u) = I
L
′(0, u) increases with to u.
If r → ∞, then there are the subsequence
→ 0, where is level of the worker s utility in
the Nash equilibrium of the r replica community.
Other words, Statement 4 is proving that the
level of shirking increases in state sector as the
number of workers community increases.
The proof of Statement 3 and Statement 4 are
omitted. The author is willing to demonstrate their
at sight.
Statement 5
One of instructive particular case of Result
Leveling System uses Stone—Geary utility function.
This utility function is widespread in theoretical
investigations and practical applications. See, for
instance, the article by Kawaguchi A. 74
If all workers are equal, labor activity of each is
(12)
Statement 6
Let us consider the Center, which tries to
maximize tax income, and community of workers
under Results Leveling System. In this case the (12)
implies tax income of the Central Planner (Center) is
(13)
( ) ( )∂∂ ∂∂I u I L L u I Ls s
I L s
s s
I L
s s s
, ; ,
, ,= = = =
> <
0 0 0 0
0 0
c
q
s
s
i ii
N
q L
=
∑
=1
u
s
rt
u
s
rt
See the (13). It is possible to analyze the Center
behavior using this equation. If Io > I
min
, then
and
(14)
In opposite case,
and
(15)
Abecedarian analysis tells us that, for large N
tax income at I0> I
min
 is much less than at I0 < I
min
.
Dependence of the Center Profit (Tax Income) on
Appendix C. The model of non state (alternative) sector suppression
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270.
25Yastremskii Oleksandr. Some Microeconomic Aspects of the Transition Process
the level of non state sector income is shown on the
Figure 17 (18 p.).
Hence, assuming N is sufficiently large and
taking the assumption
into account, we can express the Center Profit as
follows
Suppose that the Central Planner is neutral to
risk. The problem of the Center is to maximize its
expected utility profit, i.e.,
(16)
The solution of (16) depends on the distribution
of random variable ξ. Let us make the simplest
assumption, that the ξ has the uniform distribution
within the interval [−δ, δ] when value δ can be
interpreted as level of uncertainty.
It is possible to find analytical formula for
equilibrium expenditures (c*) on non state sector
suppression. If I
min
 < I0, K > δ, then
( )I c I Kc c,ξ ξ= − +0
( )CP c c c I I Kc
qL A Kc c c c I I Kc
,
,
,
min
max min
ξ ξξ ξ=
− ≥ − +
− − − + < − +

0
0
( ) ( )[ ]f c E CP c c=  →≥, maxξ 0
( )( )
( )c
I I I I qL
K
*
min min max
=
− − −
+ +
0 0
2
2
4δ δ
Using different combinations of parameters the
problem (16) has been studied. For the Center the
most interesting case is I
min
 < I0. Without suppression
of non state sector the Center can not survive,
because shirking of state sector destroys the
possibility to collect the tax.
The Center Expected Profit dependence on the
expenditures on suppression of non state sector is
shown on Figure 21 and figure at different values of
K and non state income.
Îçíàéîìèâøèñü ³ç íàâ÷àëüíèì ïïîñ³áíèêîì
Î. Î. Êàðàãîäîâî¿ òà  Ä. Ì. ×åðâàíüîâà “Ì³ê-
ðîåêîíîì³êà” (Êè¿â, ×åòâåðòà õâèëÿ,— 1997), ÿ
áóâ íåïðèºìíî çäèâîâàíèé, ïîì³òèâøè ìàòåð³-
àë (äèâ. ññ. 43—58), ùî áàçóºòüñÿ íà ìî¿õ âëàñ-
íèõ íàóêîâèõ ðåçóëüòàòàõ áåç ïîñèëàíü íà ìî¿
ðîáîòè. Çá³æíîñò³ ðàçþ÷³, àæ äî îäíàêîâèõ ïî-
çíà÷åíü (äèâ., íàïðèêëàä, Yastremsky O. A
Comparative Analysis of Labor Supply and Welfare
Level  in Different Social-Economic Environments,
Ukrainian Economic Review, 1996, v. II (3),
Philadelphia, pp. 53—72).
Íåùîäàâíî ÿ îòðèìàâ ëèñòà â³ä îäíîãî ç
ñï³âàâòîð³â çãàäàíîãî íàâ÷àëüíîãî ïîñ³áíèêà,
ÿêèé ââàæàþ çà ïîòð³áíå íàâåñòè:
Î. ßñòðåìñüêèé
ËÈÑÒ ÏÐÎ ËÈÑÒ
“Ïàíå ïðîôåñîðå ßñòðåìñüêèé!
Íà íàø æàëü, ï³ä ÷àñ ï³äãîòîâêè “Ì³êðî-
åêîíîì³êè” (Êàðàãîäîâà Î. Î., ×åðâà-
íüîâ Ä. Ì.) ìè íå áóëè çíàéîì³ ç ìàòåð³àëàìè
Âàøî¿ êíèãè (Îñíîâè ì³êðîåêîíîì³êè, Î. ßñ-
òðåìñüêèé, Î. Ãðèöåíêî), à òàêîæ ç ðàí³øå îïó-
áë³êîâàíîþ ñòàòòåþ. Öå, áåçóìîâíî, ºäèíà
ïðè÷èíà â³äñóòíîñò³ ïîñèëàííÿ íà Âàñ. Ïðèé-
ì³òü íàéùèð³ø³ âèáà÷åííÿ, é ïðîøó ðîçãëÿäà-
òè öåé ôàêò ÿê ïðèêðó òåõí³÷íó ïîõèáêó.
Î. Êàðàãîäîâà
29.01.1999”
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Figure 21. The Center Expected Profit and expenditures
on non state sector suppression (I
min
 = 175, I0 = 200, L
max
 = 1, q
= 300)
